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Never one to take his marching orders from “el imperio” (the empire) to the north, Nicaraguan
leader Daniel Ortega has come up with a signature “solution” to a conundrum he has faced since
late last year, when the US government issued sanctions against one of his key political allies,
Roberto Rivas, head of the country’s top electoral authority, the Consejo Supremo Electoral (CSE).
After weeks of conspicuous silence, the Ortega regime finally responded in early February by
introducing a curious “electoral reform” bill that the unicameral legislature, dominated by the
governing party, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN), quickly approved.
Rather than remove Rivas—as the US government and even 58% of Nicaraguan citizens would like,
according to a recent CID Gallup poll—the Ortega administration opted to keep him on as president
of the CSE but transfer his duties to the body’s vice president, Lumberto Campbell. The move was
approved by 74 of the legislature’s 92 deputies.
Campbell is now the de-facto president of the CSE, while Rivas, who hasn’t been seen in public
since the sanctions scandal erupted in December (NotiCen, Feb. 8, 2018), is free from most day-today responsibilities yet maintains his decorative title, government salary (reportedly US$5,000 per
month) and perhaps most importantly, immunity from prosecution.
Officially, the reform is an attempt to “search for administrative efficiency within the process of
modernizing the state.” Many observers, though, say it’s really just a way for Ortega to shield Rivas
while demonstrating that he’s willing to bend a little but not bow to outside pressure.
“They’re still trying to protect him, to cover up what can’t be covered up, because they continue
to confront a very delicate situation [with the US],” Mauricio Díaz, a former diplomat who ran,
unsuccessfully, for mayor of Managua last year, told the independent news magazine and website
Confidencial. “Effectively, Roberto Rivas hasn’t been condemned by any court, but [the US
sanctions] affected his assets and those of his family members, who are going to appear in the
blacklists.”
“The goal is to protect him, not to abandon him,” Díaz went on to say. “That’s the way the
Sandinistas behave. They won’t throw him to the lions or chop the fallen tree into kindling.”

Corruption claims
As president of the CSE, Rivas played a key role in helping Ortega consolidate his now virtually
uncontested position of power, most notably by green-lighting the caudillo’s 2011 reelection bid
in defiance of then-existing term-limit laws (NotiCen, May 26, 2011). Ortega went on to win that
election in a landslide (NotiCen, Nov. 17, 2011). He later pushed through a partial rewrite of the
Constitution that dropped presidential term limits altogether, and in 2016, the already long-serving
leader won yet another five-year term, this time with his wife, Rosario Murillo, serving as vice
president (NotiCen, Feb. 27, 2014, and Nov. 17, 2016).
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The CSE head has been a lightning rod for criticism as a result, especially in light of news reports
suggesting that he may have benefited financially from his loyalty to the Ortega regime. Rivas is
listed as owning multiple properties and vehicles in neighboring Costa Rica —assets that, in total
value, seem to exceed the purchasing power of a civil servant. More recently, Confidencial revealed
that the Rivas family owns a multi-million-euro home in Spain, outside of Madrid, and that in early
January, Rivas and several family members returned to Nicaragua from Spain on a pricey private jet.
Until recently, such complaints never had any obvious repercussions for Rivas, whose nearly twodecade tenure as CSE president began even before Ortega eked back into power in 2007. All of
that changed, however, on Dec. 21, when the US Treasury Department took the surprising step
of announcing sanctions against Rivas in connection with the so-called Global Magnitsky Act, a
2016 law allowing the US to target specially designated nationals (SDNs) involved in human rights
abuses or corruption. Rivas was one of more than a dozen SDNs named in the document.
“Roberto José Rivas Reyes [Rivas] has been accused in the press of amassing sizeable personal
wealth, including multiple properties, private jets, luxury vehicles, and a yacht,” the US Treasury
Department press release read. “Rivas has been described by a Nicaraguan comptroller general
as ‘above the law,’ with investigations into his corruption having been blocked by Nicaraguan
government officials. He has also perpetrated electoral fraud undermining Nicaragua’s electoral
institutions.”
Specifically, the move freezes any assets Rivas may have in US jurisdictions and bars US people
from engaging in any transactions with him. More generally, it serves as a warning call to the Ortega
administration to improve its deeply tarnished democratic credentials or risk more far-reaching
consequences along the lines of the so-called Nicaraguan Investment Conditionality Act (NICA), a
sanctions bill US lawmakers first introduced in 2016 (NotiCen, Oct. 20, 2016). The bill was drafted
shortly before the elections—held just days apart—that brought Donald Trump to power in the
US and, in Nicaragua, gave Ortega his third consecutive presidential term and fourth overall, not
including his tenure as head of the country’s post-revolutionary junta (1979-1985).

‘Missed opportunity’
As analysts have noted, the move against Rivas put the Nicaraguan leader between something of a
rock and a hard place. Bowing to US pressure and removing Rivas from the CSE could look like a
sign of weakness, particularly in the eyes of Ortega’s FSLN cohorts. Keeping the CSE president in
place, on the other hand, could alienate the Organization of American States (OAS), which agreed
early last year to help the Ortega regime “strengthen [Nicaragua’s] institutions” and thus offset
pressure from the US government.
Last month’s “electoral reform” can be seen, in that sense, as something of a compromise position,
a way for Ortega to show that he’ll protect his allies, no matter how grievous the accusations against
them, while assuring the OAS that, in practical terms, it will no longer have to deal with Rivas. And
yet, few outside of the reform’s FSLN backers applauded the maneuver.
The US ambassador to Nicaragua, Laura Dogu, called it a “missed opportunity” not only to hold
Rivas accountable for his alleged misdeeds, but to introduce electoral changes that the country really
could use. It was also a chance to improve relations between the two countries.
“I know that a lot of people in the US are keeping an eye on what’s happening here in Nicaragua,”
she said, presumably in reference to an updated version of the NICA bill that is currently making
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its way through Congress and, like the 2016 original, calls on the US to oppose non-humanitarian
loans to Nicaragua unless the Nicaraguan government takes “effective steps to hold free, fair, and
transparent elections, and for other purposes.”
US authorities aren’t the only ones complaining about deteriorating democratic conditions in
Nicaragua, where Ortega has used a number of blatant power plays to both extend and expand
his hold on power. After dispatching a team of observers for last year’s nationwide municipal
elections, the OAS issued a report suggesting that there is “space to strengthen the legal, technical,
procedural, technological, and human aspects of electoral processes in Nicaragua.” The report,
which was formally presented on Dec. 20—exactly one day before the Trump administration
announced the sanctions against Rivas—also said, “Nicaragua’s electoral system would benefit from
a comprehensive electoral reform that addresses various topics.”
Needless to say, the electoral reform that Nicaraguan lawmakers approved in February was not
the kind of “comprehensive” overhaul the authors of the recent OAS report had in mind. How
willing the international body will be to keep working with Nicaragua now that Rivas’s role in the
CSE—if not his title—has been relegated remains to be seen. At first glance, the situation doesn’t
seem to bode well. As El Nuevo Diario pointed out in a Feb. 19 editorial, Rivas is still technically the
president of the electoral body and is thus, at least on paper, the designated go-between.
“Regardless of whether or not he committed the acts of corruption for which he was sanctioned,
Roberto Rivas is no longer a suitable person to represent the electoral authority before the OAS,”
the Nicaraguan daily argued. “The CSE ought to be presided over by someone who isn’t questioned
either in or outside the country … Roberto Rivas should resign.”

-- End --
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